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rights? There is very little Canadian literature on Aboriginal peoples and human
rights, and this book helps to explain why: the relationship between Aboriginal and
human rights is inadequately defined. Kulchyski takes the first step towards clarifying
this relationship by identifying what distinguishes Aboriginal rights from human
rights. The distinction highlights that the struggles of  Aboriginal peoples differ
from those of  other marginalised peoples such as women or religious minorities.
Aboriginal struggles are against a colonial state that uses rights to further its colonial
project. Kulchyski does not outright reject the value of  human rights, but simply
asks us to view them as a practice and find the particular contexts in which they are
useful. 
This book is essential reading for scholars working in human rights or na-
tive studies. The content itself  is not particularly new, although the third section
presents several case studies based on Kulchyski’s own research. What makes it
unique is the framing of  this content. The book is essential for scholars because it
forces the reader to question some deeply entrenched beliefs about human rights.
Of  course, many will not welcome this shift in thinking. A more receptive audience
however will be Indigenous activists and non-Indigenous allies looking to transform
capitalist and colonialist systems. Kulchyski has deeply Marxist ideals and corre-
spondingly revolutionary intentions. He inspires the reader to action by demon-
strating that there is real need for change and providing some possible pathways
towards it.
Jason Chalmers
University of  Alberta
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The contemporary history of  Oman may be said to have begun in 1970 when Sultan
Qaboos replaced his father as ruler and set the country firmly on the path to socio-
economic development and to political evolution. Oil provided the means for the
former while the course of  the latter was principally determined by the personality
and vision of  the present sultan, still in power some 45 years later. The Sultanate
of  Oman is unquestionably an authoritarian state but most would agree that it has
a benevolent ruler and that its people believe that the existing system is legitimate.
But two relevant qualifications should be noted. First, the throne must pass in the
coming years to a new sultan and considerable uncertainty surrounds the process
of  succession. Second, as education and exposure to the outside world advances
and deepens, younger Omanis may be increasingly discontent with the system as it
presently exists.
In this book, apparently derived from a British PhD thesis, Sulaiman Al-
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Farsi notes the general classification of  Oman as a rentier state but he also seeks to
locate the social contract between ruler and ruled within the concept of  shura, an
Arabic word usually translated as “consultation.” Al-Farsi starts with two basic
premises. First, he contends that Oman is the only country that has maintained
shura throughout its history. Second, he discerns that the present Sultanate is tran-
sitioning smoothly from “traditional shura” (the role of  religious and tribal notables
in selecting and legitimating imams, Oman’s religious cum secular leaders, throughout
most of  the Islamic period until near the present) to “current shura” (the institution
by the modern state of  first appointed and then elected consultative councils).
His opening chapters on the concept of  democratization in the Arab
world and the Omani context are somewhat disappointing as they add little original
and display a rather lackadaisical use of  sources. But Al-Farsi reaches his stride in
the final three chapters that form the heart of  the book. He conducted extensive
interviews with thirty Omanis and divided these into three equal groups of  respon-
dents based principally on their position or role in society. He posits as three distinct
models regarding the role and importance of  shura in Oman, and the interviews il-
lustrate differences in attitudes about what shura means today and how it affects the
future evolution of  Omani politics.
The first of  these models is the “traditional” one with respondents drawn
from religious institutions and backgrounds. The conception of  shura to this seg-
ment is inextricably linked to principles within the Ibadi sect of  Islam (to which
perhaps one-half  of  all Omanis adhere), although some respondents claim pre-Is-
lamic roots. Citing the role of  shura in the selection of  Ibadi imams, these respon-
dents argued that the principle of  shura was necessary to legitimate any government
and that the current government in Oman fulfilled the requirements. Their view of
contemporary shura was that it remained faithful to the religion-based requirements
of  traditional shura even as participation was expanded.
Next is a “top-down” model led by the government and based its creation
of  first the appointed State Consultative Council and then that organ’s replacement
by the Shura Council, which was gradually transformed into a completely elected
body. Complementing the Shura Council is the State Council, an appointed body
of  senior notables. The ten respondents discussed in this category are government
officials who express the view that the opening of  the tribal horizons of  Omani
society requires a patient and gradual approach. The continuation and adaptation
of  shura is necessary because it “is seen as the cornerstone of  the legitimacy and
authority of  the state.” (90) They contend that it was possible for the state to adopt
some modern democratic institutions (elections and parliamentary bodies) because
of  their commonalities with shura. The innovation lies in the expansion of  the shura
process from a traditional approach (which restricted participation to civic and re-
ligious notables) to a new approach incorporating mass participation and the elec-
tion of  representatives from throughout society. There was also an attempt to
perceive harmony between the two types of  shura by equating the appointed State
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Council with a traditional council of  the elite while the Shura Council represents
the modern form.
The third “bottom-up” model represents the views of  younger, educated
Omanis who find themselves faced with the necessity of  squaring traditional norms
and practices with the appeal of  democracy. Al-Farsi perceives consensus regarding
the utility of  adopting some aspects of  democratic principles to Oman but with
the distinction that the equal separation of  powers in Western states between exec-
utive, judicial, and legislative branches is not applicable in Oman where the separate
authorities converge at the ruling level. These Omanis appear to see no conflict be-
tween traditional and contemporary shura although they share the concern with the
other groups about “tribal fanaticism” resulting in a lower standard of  elected mem-
bers to the Shura Council, particularly as many graduates refrain from participa-
tion.
The overall effect of  the study is the convergence of  the three groups’
views that the present system both fulfills Oman’s requirements at present and that
a non-elected ruler is best for the Omani polity. Indeed, Al-Farsi speculates that
“stability in the position of  a ruler in Islam so long as he is found suitable and ca-
pable may suit Middle Eastern societies better than presidential democracies because
the presence of  the social divisions may find open democratic environment a fertile
soil to strengthen their positions above all others, including the national interests.”
(180) As a result, the younger generations seem more likely to seek gradual and con-
trolled evolution within the present system than to seek Western-style democracy.
Their position, therefore, is in close agreement with both the top-down and tradi-
tional segments.
It can certainly be argued that these attitudes reflect the benign atmosphere
of  a rentier state that promises economic prosperity in exchange for political qui-
escence, accompanied by a measure of  paternalism. The Omani protesters inspired
by the Arab spring demanded jobs and an end to corruption while explicitly voicing
their allegiance to the sultan. Still, there is much to be said about an innate Omani
philosophy (mirrored in other Gulf  monarchies) that emphasizes consensus and
harmony over individual rights. Given that Oman’s experiment with a modern state
is less than fifty years old, there probably can be no authoritative answer. But Al-
Farsi clearly has provided valuable substance to ponder.
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